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1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical explanation of one way trade based on strategic in-
teractions rather than countries asymmetries (comparative advantage), in a perfectly
symmetric oligopolistic framework. The traditional explanation of one way trade is
in terms of inter-industry trade. This paper is about unilateral intra-industry trade,
i.e. our explanation of unilateral trade in a given industry relies on strategic interac-
tions between firms operating in the same industry. The novelty of our approach is
twofold: first, we use a more general cost function than the one usually adopted in the
literature capable of taking into account scope economies. By definition, economies
(diseconomies) of scope occurs when the average total cost of production decreases
(increases) as a result of increasing the number of diﬀerent goods being produced,
which, in presence of trade, corresponds to the number of markets being served. The
idea is that there are joint cost/benefit in serving both the domestic and the foreign
market. Secondly, we allow firms to strategically choose whether to export into each
other market rather than assuming that two way trade exists per se. In a Brander
and Krugman (1983) type of model, if international trade is possible, it is implicitly
assumed that firms engage in two way trade.1 Despite the fact that each firm would
prefer not to export and act as a monopolist in its own domestic market, strategic
interaction leads to a Prisoner‘s Dilemma, in which the sub-optimal (from firms‘
point of view) outcome is reciprocal trade. An interesting stream of literature (Pinto,
1986; Fung, 1991, 1992, inter alia) points out that firms could escape this Prisoner‘s
Dilemma through collusion, in infinitely repeated games. Having in mind a 2x2 ma-
trix in which firms can decide to export or not to export into each other market
before engaging in price or quantity competition, the existing literature, either static
or dynamic, has focussed only on two possible equilibria: two way trade, in a static
context, and autarchy in a dynamic context. The possibility of one way trade arising
as a possible Nash equilibrium of the trade game, i.e. one firm exports while the rival
does not, has been ignored so far. The key result of our analysis is that international
trade can be explained by a chicken game rather than by a prisoner’s dilemma,
meaning that an asymmetric equilibrium (unilateral trade) can come out from firms’
strategic interaction in a perfectly symmetric environment. Indeed, our paper shows
1See also Brander (1981).
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that even if all trade barriers have been almost completely abolished, this does not
automatically imply that firms actually engage in two way trade, as usually assumed
when international trade is allowed.
In the second part of the paper, we aim to compare the private with the social
incentives towards one way trade, investigating whether there exists a parameter
region where the outcome of the trade game played by national governments seeking
to maximize domestic welfare corresponds to the one resulting from the interaction
between firms.
Throughout the paper we consider two types of trade costs incurred in exporting
goods from one country to the other, namely, per unit and ad valorem trade costs.2
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Under both types of trade costs,
one way trade arises as Nash equilibrium of the trade game played by firms if the
level of trade costs is suﬃciently high. As markets become more integrated, the
likelihood of observing two way trade increases. With regard to the trade game
played by planners (governments), we have to distinguish between two scenarios,
according to the type of trade cost considered. Under per unit trade costs, exactly as
for firms, a suﬃciently high level of trade cost is necessary to have one way trade. The
comparison with the private incentives towards one way trade unveils that there exist
both a conflict region, in which private and social incentives dramatically diverge,
and a region in which both the governments and the firms would choose one way
trade. The former result is interesting in that, quite surprisingly, one way trade is a
socially desirable outcome. Under ad valorem trade costs there exists only a conflict
area: the private and the social incentives towards one way trade never coincide.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The model is laid out in
section 2. Section 3 deals with per unit trade costs, while section 4 looks at ad valorem
trade costs. Section 5 studies social incentives towards one way trade. Conclusions
are provided in section 6.
2The existing literature has also looked at another type of trade costs, namely fixed trade costs,
accounting for costs of product certification, adjustment to local regulation, costs of maintaining a
distribution network, foreign red tape.
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2 The Model
Two firms, firm a located in country A and firm b located in country B, are engaged
in a one shot two stage game: at the first stage each firm chooses simultaneously
and non cooperatively whether or not to export into each other market and, at the
second stage, both firms compete in quantities (à la Cournot). Let qi and q∗i denote
the output that firm i = {a, b} produces for domestic and foreign consumption,
respectively. In each country, the inverse market demand is given by:
pj = 1−Qj, j = {A,B} (1)
where QA = qa+ q∗b and QB = qb+ q
∗
a stand for industry output in country A and B,
respectively. On the supply side, we assume that production costs are interrelated,
i.e. scope eﬀects are present:3
ci(qi; q∗i ) = αqi + βqiq
∗
i + αq
∗
i , i = {a, b} (2)
In order to simplify the analysis, and without any further loss of generality, we will
normalize α to zero.4 Parameter β represents the eﬀect of the joint cost/benefit.
Negative β indicate the presence of economies of scope.5 For example, there might be
positive spillovers because of learning eﬀects if activities are similar and the learning
rate depends on cumulative joint production or network externalities when using a
common resource. For positive β, the firm faces diseconomies of scope by serving both
markets.6 These may be due to congestion or switching costs when there are joint
capacities, increased maintenance costs of flexible techniques, increasing marginal
opportunity cost of capital (imperfect capital markets) or forgone learning eﬀects
when activities are dissimilar. Other reasons for diseconomies of scope are costs of
control and coordination which rise in the scope of a firm (managerial diseconomies).
Trade is associated with either per unit τ or ad valorem t trade costs incurred in
exporting goods from one country to the other. Per unit trade costs can be thought
3Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) use a similar approach to model economies of scope,
but consider quadratic unit-costs of each single product.
4This does not alter the qualitative results obtained. The resulting cost function is also used by
Dixon (1992) when he considers two multiproduct firms.
5See Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) for the concept of diseconomies of scope. See also Teece
(1982), Porter (1985) and Westland (1992).
6See Gal-Or (1993), Zimmermann (1979) and Westland (1992) on these issues.
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primarily as transportation costs and/or specific tariﬀs, for instance tariﬀs levied
on intermediate goods (see Mujundar, 2004), while ad valorem trade costs include
general tariﬀs, insurance costs and exchange rate risks.
We solve the game by backward induction, i.e. we first solve the marketing game
and then we proceed to analyzing the first stage, which can be described by the
following matrix:
a\b T NT
T π (T, T ) ; π (T, T ) π (T,NT ) ; π (NT, T )
NT π (NT, T ) ; π (T,NT ) π (NT,NT ) ; π (NT,NT )
(M1)
Each firm may decide simultaneously and independently to export (T ) or not to
export (NT ). Although it would be Pareto eﬃcient for firms to agree not to export
into each other market, in a one shot game a two way trade arises as a unique Nash
equilibrium resulting from a prisoner’s dilemma.7 To the best of our knowledge, the
possibility of one way trade being an outcome of the trade game has been ignored.
Yet it is fair enough to say that one way trade involving homogeneous products is
actually observed to take place among similar countries.
We first look at per unit trade costs. Then we will proceed with analyzing the
case of ad valorem trade costs.
3 Per unit trade costs
Suppose both firms decide to export. As usual in the literature, each firm chooses its
output level for domestic and foreign consumption separately. The problem of firm
a is to choose qa and q∗a so as to maximize its own profit πa = pAqa+(pB − τ) q∗a− ca
and similarly for firm b. Symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities are given
by:8
q =
β − 1− τ (1 + β)
β2 + 2β − 3
(3)
7In repeated games, several authors (Pinto, 1986; Fung, 1991; 1992) have shown that autarchy
can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium for suﬃciently large discount factor.
8Quantities and prices are always admissible if τ < (1−β)/2. Second order conditions are always
satisfied.
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q∗ =
β − 1 + 2τ
β2 + 2β − 3
(4)
while equilibrium profit amounts to:
π (T, T ) =
(1− τ)
¡
2− 3β + β3
¢
− τ 2
¡
β2 − 5
¢
(1− β)2 (3 + β)2
(5)
Now, we consider the case in which only one firm, say firm a, exports while the rival
does not. This is the outcome we are particularly interested in since it involves one
way trade. The problem for the exporting firm now consists in setting the monopolist
quantity at home and the optimal quantity for foreign consumption being aware of the
fact that the rival will react only in its own domestic market. Although consumers in
country B are still served by both firms, now the quantities oﬀered by the two firms
diﬀer w.r.t. the previous case. This is due to the fact that costs are interrelated, so
the cost of producing for domestic consumption only diﬀers from the cost of producing
for both the domestic and the foreign market. In particular, it is higher (lower) if
there are diseconomies (economies) of scope. When β > 0 we expect that the not
exporting firm produces more than it would have by serving also the foreign market.
Indeed, with diseeconomies of scope the not exporting firm is able to save on costs.
Solutions turn out to be:
qa =
−3 + β − 2τβ
2
¡
β2 − 3
¢ ; q∗a = β − 1 + 2τβ2 − 3 (6)
and
qb =
−2− 2τ − β + β2
2
¡
β2 − 3
¢ (7)
By comparing (7) with (3), it is easy to verify that qb > q and that they are equal
only when β = 0, i.e. without scope economies.
The profit accruing to the exporting and the not exporting firm write respectively:
π (T,NT ) =
13− 4τ
¡
4− β2
¢
(1− β − τ) + β
¡
2β2 − 8− 3β
¢
4
¡
β2 − 3
¢2 (8)
π (NT, T ) =
¡
2 + 2τ + β − β2
¢2
4
¡
β2 − 3
¢2 (9)
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When both firms choose not to export into each other market, they are monopolist
in their own country: the payoﬀ is 1/4 for both.
After having computed all the relevant payoﬀs, we are now in a position to study
the matrix (M1). Suppose firm b decides not to export. The optimal behavior for
firm a will be to export if π (T,NT ) > π (NT,NT ). By a direct comparison it turns
out that this is always the case. Hence, if π (NT, T ) > π (T, T ) for firm b then the
equilibrium of the trade game will be either (NT, T ) or (T,NT ). In words, only one
firm engages in international trade. By (9) and (5), the threshold of the level of per
unit trade costs such that the trade game is a chicken game is
bτ = (1− β) ¡−36 + β ¡24 + β ¡49 + β ¡−8− 14β + β3¢¢¢¢
2
¡
−36 + β
¡
−12 + β
¡
37 + β
¡
4− 10β + β3
¢¢¢¢ (10)
Proposition 1 If τ > bτ one way trade arises. If otherwise τ < bτ two way trade
arises.
The figure below explains our first proposition:
Figure 1
6
-
τ
(1− β)/2
bτ
1/2
0 10.72 β
I II
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Area I covers the case in which π (NT, T ) < π (T, T ) while, in area II, π (NT, T ) >
π (T, T ). Hence, in area II the trade game is a chicken game with unilateral trade
resulting as equilibrium; in area I the traditional two way trade arises.
4 Ad Valorem trade costs
Suppose both firms decide to export. The problem of firm a is to choose qa and q∗a
so as to maximize its own profit, now given by πa = pAqa + (1− t) pBq∗a − ca and
similarly for firm b. Symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities are given by:9
qi =
(t− 1) (β − 1)
t (β − 3)− (β − 1) (3 + β) (11)
q∗i =
1− t− β
t (β − 3)− (β − 1) (3 + β) (12)
while the equilibrium profit level is:
π (T, T ) =
(1− t)
¡
2 + t2 + 3t (β − 1)− 3β + β3
¢
[t (β − 3)− (β − 1) (3 + β)]2
(13)
Assume now firm a exports while firm b does not. Proceeding as before, firm a’s
solutions write:
qa =
(1− t) (β − 3)
2
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢ ; q∗a = −1 + t+ β−3 + 3t+ β2 (14)
while the optimal quantity for firm b is
qb =
2t+ (β − 2) (1 + β)
2
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢ (15)
Using equilibrium quantities we obtain the expressions of equilibrium profits for the
exporting and the not exporting firm, respectively:
π (T,NT ) =
(1− t) (13 + 4t2 + t (−17 + β (8 + β)) + β (−8 + β (−3 + 2β)))
4
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢2 (16)
π (NT, T ) =
(2t+ (β − 2) (1 + β))2
4
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢2 (17)
9Quantities and prices are always admissible if t < 1 − β. Again, second order conditions are
always satisfied.
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In the autarchy case, each firm acts as a monopolist in its own domestic market: as
before, the payoﬀ corresponds to 1/4 for both. We are now in a position to study the
matrix (M1). Following the same steps as before we get a threshold of the level of
ad valorem trade costs such that the trade game is a chicken game. For expositional
purposes let us call this threshold ρ1.
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Proposition 2 If t > ρ1 one way trade arises. If t < ρ1, then two way trade arises.
The following figure compares the ad valorem with the per unit trade costs sce-
nario.
Figure 2
6
-
τ , t
1/2
1
0 10.72 β
I
II
III
ρ1
bτ
In region I and II we have a trade game of chicken in the case of per unit trade
costs; in region II and III we have the same one way trade result in the case of ad
valorem trade costs; quite interestingly, in region II one way trade arises no matter
the type of trade costs.
10The expression of ρ1 is available upon request. Figure 2 plots ρ1 in the space β, t.
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5 Social incentives: planners‘ trade game
In this section we consider the trade game played by hypothetical national planners
(governments) seeking to maximize domestic welfare. We are interested in under-
standing whether one way trade can be achieved also through the strategic interaction
between the two planners. Secondly, we aim to compare the private with the social
incentives towards one way trade, investigating whether there exists a parameter re-
gion where the outcome of the trade game played by governments corresponds to the
one resulting from the interaction between firms. If so, one way trade is a socially
desirable outcome, in that neither planner may improve upon.
As in the previous section, we solve the game by backward induction, i.e. we
first solve the marketing game and then we go through the analysis of the first stage,
described by the following matrix:
A\B T NT
T W (T, T ) ; W (T, T ) W (T,NT ) ;W (NT, T )
NT W (NT, T ) ; W (T,NT ) W (NT,NT ) ; W (NT,NT )
(M2)
In order to solve the game we use the same methodology as the one adopted to study
M1. The unique diﬀerence is that now the payoﬀs are given by welfare instead of
profit levels. For the planner in charge of maximizing the welfare in country A, the
objective function is defined by WA = πa + CSA + RA, where CSA is the level of
consumer surplus in country A and RA is the tax revenue collected in country A,
and similarly for country B. Given the linearity of the market demand, CSj = Q2j/2,
with j = {A,B}. As to Rj, we have to distinguish between two cases, according to
the type of trade costs.
5.1 Per unit trade costs
Each government levies a specific tax on each unit of import. Then, RA = τq∗b and
RB = τq∗a. Consider first the case where both the firm located in country A and the
firm located in country B export. In this situation, consumer surplus in each country
amounts to:
CS =
(2− τ)2
2 (β + 3)2
(18)
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and the welfare level in each country is given by:
W =
2β3 + 4β2 − 2τβ2 + 3τ 2β2 − 14β + 6τ 2β + 4τβ − τ 2 + 8− 2τ
2
¡
3− β2 − 2β
¢
(1− β) (β + 3)
(19)
Now, we consider the case in which only one firm, say firm a, exports while the
rival does not. When firm a exports while firm b does not, consumer surplus in the
two countries diﬀers as follows:
CSA =
(3− β + 2τβ)2
8
¡
β2 − 3
¢2 (20)
CSB =
¡
4− 2τ − β − β2
¢2
8
¡
3− β2
¢2 (21)
Clearly, if firm b does not export the revenue collected by the government in country
A is nil. Taking this into account, we get two diﬀerent levels of welfare in the two
countries:
WA =
35− 22β + 44τβ − 5β2 + 4τβ2 − 4τ 2β2 − 32τ + 32τ 2 − 8τβ3 + 4β3
8
¡
β2 − 3
¢2 (22)
WB =
24 + 24τ − 13β2 − 36τ 2 − 12τβ − 12τβ2 − 2β3 + 3β4 + 8τβ3 + 16τ 2β2
8
¡
β2 − 3
¢2 (23)
In the autarchy case, each firm gets 1/4 while consumer surplus amount to 1/8.
Since revenues for governments are nil, W = 3/8. Now, we are in a position to fulfil
the matrix M2 and characterize the set of Nash equilibria. In particular, one way
trade arises whenW (T,NT ) > W (NT,NT ) andW (T, T ) < W (NT, T ). Easy com-
putations suﬃce to check that W (T,NT ) > W (NT,NT ) always in the admissible
parameter range, and that W (T, T )−W (NT, T ) admits the following root:
eτ = −72 + β (144 + β (27 + β (−147 + β (18 + β (38− β (5 + 3β))))))
2
¡
−4 + β + β2
¢
(18 + β (−9 + β (−3 + β (9 + β))))
(24)
Proposition 3 Under per unit trade costs, one way trade arises as equilibrium if
τ > eτ , while two way trade arises as equilibrium if τ < eτ .
The following figure compares the social with the private incentives towards one
way trade under per unit trade costs:
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Figure 3
6
-
τ
1/2
0 1
(1− β)/2
0.720.65 β
I
III
II
IV
In region IV one way trade is the equilibrium of both the firms’ and the planners’
trade game. In this region there is no conflict between private and social incentives
towards one way trade. In region I, firms choose one way while planners would prefer
them to engage in a two way trade; in region II is the opposite, firms choose two way
trade but planners would like them to play a chicken game. These two areas clearly
depicts two situations of conflict between private and social incentives towards one
way trade. Finally, area III corresponds to a case in which two way trade is the
equilibrium of both the planners’ and the firms’ trade game.
5.2 Ad Valorem trade costs
Each government levies an ad valorem tax on each unit of import. Then, RA = tpAq∗b
and RB = tpBq∗a. Consider first the case in which both firms are engaged in a two
way trade. In this situation, consumer surplus in each country writes:
CS =
(2t− tβ − 2 + 2β)2
2
¡
tβ − 3t− β2 − 2β + 3
¢2 (25)
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and the corresponding welfare level obtains:
W =
8− 16t− 14β + 22tβ + 4β2 + 2β3 + 8t2 − 8t2β + 3t2β2 − 6tβ2
2
¡
tβ − 3t− 2β − β2 + 3
¢2 (26)
Then, let us consider the scenario in which firm a exports while firm b does not.
As to the consumer surplus, we get:
CSA =
(1− t)2 (β − 3)2
8
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢2 (27)
CSB =
¡
4t− 4 + β + β2
¢2
8
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢2 (28)
The equilibrium level of profits of the marketing game in the asymmetric case for the
exporting and the not exporting firm write respectively:
π (T,NT ) =
(1− t) (13 + 4t2 + t (−17 + β (8 + β)) + β (−8 + β (−3 + 2β)))
4
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢2 (29)
π (NT, T ) =
(2t+ (β − 2) (1 + β))2
4
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢2 (30)
By using the definition of welfare, we obtain the following expressions:
WA =
(1− t)
¡
−5β2 − 22β + 35 + tβ2 + 22tβ − 43t+ 8t2 + 4β3
¢
8
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢2 (31)
WB =
24− 40t− 4tβ − 13β2 − 2β3 + 8t2 + 4t2β + 4t2β2 + 8tβ2 + 4tβ3 + 8t3 + 3β4
8
¡
−3 + 3t+ β2
¢2
(32)
Proceeding as before in studying M2, we can state the following:
Proposition 4 Under ad valorem trade costs, the trade game played by governments
is never a chicken game, i.e. one way trade never arises.
The following figure illustrates the above proposition:
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Figure 4
6
-
t
1
0 1
1− β
0.650.6 β
I II
We would have had a chicken game ifW (T,NT ) > W (NT,NT ) andW (T, T ) <
W (NT, T ). The case in which W (T,NT ) > W (NT,NT ) corresponds to area I,
while the case in which W (T, T ) < W (NT, T ) corresponds to area II. Clearly, one
way trade requires area I and II to overlap, but, in the admissible parameter range,
this never happens.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that unilateral trade in a given industry can arise as
a result of the strategic interaction between firms facing the decision to export or
not to export into each other market. The traditional explanation of one way trade
is in terms of inter-industry trade. Our paper tries to identify a unilateral trade by
looking at one industry in isolation, i.e., within the framework usually adopted to
study intra-industry trade. To the best of our knowledge, in the literature, intra-
industry trade, either in homogeneous or diﬀerentiated products, is a two way trade.
In a Brander and Krugman (1983) type of model, when international trade is allowed,
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each firm serves both the domestic and the foreign market. Yet, in the real world,
there are plenty of firms serving only their own domestic markets, even if, in line
of principle, they might start exporting. By dealing with both per unit and ad
valorem trade costs, we have shown that unilateral trade can result as an equilibrium
of the trade game which has the characteristics of a chicken game: an asymmetric
equilibrium can arise in a perfectly symmetric environment. Furthermore, under
per unit trade costs, unilateral trade is also the outcome of the strategic interaction
between two hypothetical national governments seeking to maximize domestic welfare,
in a significant parameter range.
All the results obtained in this paper crucially depend on the assumption on the
existence of scope eﬀects. When scope eﬀects are negligible, two way trade always
results from the strategic interaction between firms, so one can avoid to model firms’
choice upon exports.
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